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LEGAL SYSTEM
An American lawyer's reflections on Pepper v. Hart
I.

Introductjon

American law has long been quite untidy with respect to its permitted approaches to
statutory interpretation. There are, at present, at least three distinct approaches to
interpretation, which courts may employ in a case to determine the meaning of a
statutory text. I
The textuaIist approach has undergone a recent renaissance following the appointment
2
of many politically conservative jurists by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Most
3
prominent among these jurists are Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Thomas and
Court of Appeals Judge Easterbrook. The avowed goal oftextuaIism is objectivity
and the general rule of this approach is that courts must rely solely on the words of the
statute to determine its meaning. S Textualists are particularly wary about using
legislative history to discern the meaning of statutes."
A second approach - common in America but skeptically received in Britain - is the
intentionalist approach, which seeks to interpret legislation based on legislative
intent. 7 Intentionalists discern legislative intent from statutory text and legislative
history. This willingness to inquire beyond the statutory text in any case contrasts
starkly with the textuaIist approach and leaves this second approach subject to the
criticism that it gives too much interpretive discretion to courts." TextuaIists are
foundationalists, who will refer, at least initially, only to text to infer meaning," while
intentionalists are typically nonfoundationalists, who will look at any evidence of
legislative intent, including both text and legislative history, to fmd the meaning of
even the otherwise clear text of statutes." The question whether interpretation should
be foundationalist or nonfoundationalist appears at its core to be the question whether
interpretation should be based on text or context. IntentionaIists are typically
contextuaIists, while textuaIists are, well, textuaIists.
The third common approach to interpretation in the United States is purposivism,
which seeks to give statutes the meaning that will allow the statute to meet its
purpose. I I This approach, which is closely associated in the United States with
Professors Hart and Sacks and their Legal Process approach to law,12 has its roots in
the Mischief Rule stated by Lord Coke in Heydon's Case. 13 The purposivist approach
in America is quite close to the accepted purposivist approach in England, which
allows judges to infer the statute's purpose from the statutory text as well as from
legislative history. This approach, though, is criticized in the United States both by
14
intentionalists and by textuaIists alike.
These three approaches do not exhaust the interpretive methods of American
lawyers. IS Moreover, prominent American legal scholars have urged a practical
reasoning approach to interpretation, which would employ, inter alia, the use of all
three of these interpretive methods in an effort to discern the best legal answer to each
interpretive question.t" Indeed, the American law of statutory interpretation is

remarkably untidy both because litigants cannot be sure whether courts will
one interpretive approach or another in a particular case and because a jurist
seems quite committed to pursuing a particular interpretive approach in one
be willing to adopt without notice a competing approach when deciding the
17
case.

pursue
who
case may
next

When I began teaching law in 1990, the conventional American view was that English
law was far tidier because courts were prohibited from using legislative history to
interpret statutes. 18 I would likely still have that view today, if! had not seen
scholarly references to the House of Lords' decision in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v
19
Hart.
Moreover, the decision was reproduced as a leading case in the second edition
of the text that I use to teach a course on legislation in the United States.20 Pepper v
Hart, then, presented many academic and other lawyers in America with an
opportunity to reflect about English approaches to statutory interpretation and how
those approaches compared to our dishevelled American law.

II.

The Pe.f2Pery Hart Decision and the Limited Abandonment of the
Exclusionary Rule

Pepper v Hart gave American lawyers a number of insights into the English law of
statutory interpretation. For example, English law as described by the case was not as
tidy as had been thought. To be sure, the case does state what Americans had
believed was true about English law: "[u]nder present law, there is a general rule that
references to parliamentary material as an aid to statutory contruction is not
permissible (the exclusionary rule).,,21 Notwithstanding that rule, however, Pepper
recognized that the rule of exclusion had an important and long-standing exception.
This exception applies when the legislative materials identify the mischief the statute
was intended to cure, rather than the "meaning of the words used by Parliament to
effect such cure. ,,22
For an American lawyer who teaches statutory interpretation, Pepper is thus quite
interesting because it accepts in a fundamental way the distinction between
purposivism and intentionalism - a distinction that my students often have great
difficulty discerning - and makes the application of an important rule of interpretation
23
tum on that distinction.
For almost a century, English courts have allowed
legislative history in the form of reports of commissioners and white papers to be
construed to infer the mischief to be cured, in other words the purpose of legislation,
but not the intended meaning of the statutory text.
Having defined this more equivocal bar against the consideration of legislative
history, the House of Lords in Pepper decided to modify that rule of exclusion. Lord
Browne-Wilkinson stated that the new rule would be the following:
"reference to parliamentary materials should be permitted as an aid to the
construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal
meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases references in court
to parliamentary materials should only be permitted where such material
clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind
the ambiguous or obscure words. In the case of statements made in

2

Parliament, as at present advised I cannot foresee that any statement other than
the statement of the minister or other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet
..
,,24
th ese cntena.
This change in the exclusionary rule presents a clear acceptance of the intentionalist
approach to interpretation in some circumstances. Lord Browne-Wilkinson sought to
limit those circumstances clearly by requiring that three tests be met before legislative
history could be considered. The first such requirement is that the statutory text be
garbled, because it is either ambiguous, obscure, or absurd. Lord Browne-Wilkinson
then required that the legislative history demonstrate a clearly signfied intent, with
clear signification being inferred from both an unambiguous meaning with respect to
the issue in controversy and a trustworthy pedigree, that is, the source of the history
must be reliable and knowledgeable.
Pepper v Hart itself provides important insights into the significance of the first of
these requirements. The garbled text requirement indicates that the House of Lords
intends that courts be foundationalist in interpreting statutes and that opportunities for
resort to legislative history will thereby be limited. Because, in the court's view,
"Parliament never intends to enact an ambiguity ,',25the statutory text is likely to be
6
garbled in only a rare case and resort to legislative history will accordingly be rare.2
The garbled text requirement was therefore seen as important in limiting the extra
costs of litigation that might result from a nonfoundationalist, American approach to
interpretation that would permit legislative history to trump the otherwise clear
meaning of statutory text.
There are many United States Supreme Court cases in which that Court has declined
to give effect to clear statutory text because it was convinced that the clear text did not
reflect either Congress's plain intent or purpose, as shown by the legislative history.
In Train v Colorado Public Interest Research Group,27 the Supreme Court held that a
court may rely on legislative history to construe a statute even when the statute's
language is clear on its face.28 The Court then relied on the legislative history to
conclude that the statutory term "radioactive materials," which was included in the
Clean Water Act as a specific example of a type of "pollutant,',29 did not include
radioactive materials regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission. This reading of
the statute was supported by the relevant congressional committee reports.i'' The
Court rejected the textualist approach, which would have fourid any radioactive
materials to be pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Water Act:
"reliance on the 'plain meaning' of the words 'radioactive materials' contained
in the definition of 'pollutant' in the [Clean Water Act] contributes little to our
understanding of whether Congress intended the Act to encompass the
regulation of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials. To have
included these materials under the [Act] would have marked a significant
alteration of the pervasive regulatory scheme embodied in the [Atomic Energy
Act]. Far from containing the clear indication oflegislative intent that we
might expect before recognizing such a change in policy, the legislative
history reflects, on balance, an intention to preserve the pre-existing regulatory
,,31
I
pan.
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An even more frequently mentioned example of the Supreme Court's willingness to
ignore the clear meaning of a statutory text is Church of the Holy Trinity v United
States?2 There, the Court ignored the broad scope of a statutory prohibition that had
several specific, well-defined exceptions and concluded that the statutory prohibition
on employment contracts did not apply to the employment contract of a clergyman.
The Court reached this conclusion, even though none of the statutory exceptions
applied, because the Court decided that the purpose of the statute as shown by the
legislative history was to prohibit only certain types of employment contracts and a
contract with a clergyman was outside of the purpose. Neither of these interpretations
could have been defended if the Court had been foreclosed from considering the
legislative history when the statutory text was clear.
Because legislative history can have this decisive impact in American courts,
American lawyers seek to make the strongest nonfoundational argument possible
based on intent or purpose when the statutory text is adverse to the position of their
client. Moreover, the careful litigator, unsure of the interpretive approach the court
will take in deciding any case, must make the strongest possible argument based on
text and intent and purpose in order to give clients the best possible representation.
This approach to litigating statutory cases, does, of course, greatly increase the cost of
representation, because lawyers in all cases must research not only the statutory text,
but also the legislative history, to develop the best case for their client.
To be sure, therefore, the American experience demonstrates that, iflimiting litigation
costs is a desirable goal, there is good reason to define a threshold requirement that
will limit resort to legislative history. Pepper v Hart, however, demonstrates the
difficulty of defining a meaningful requirement. Recall that the interpretive issue in
Pepper was how the value to taxpayers of an in-house fringe benefit should be
calculated. The parties disputed whether the statutory text, which required that the
value of the benefit was equal to the "amount of any expense incurred in or in
connection with,,33 providing the fringe benefit, meant "the marginal cost caused by
the provision of the benefit in question or a proportion of the total cost incurred in
providing the service both for the public and for the employee (the average cost).,,34
The House of Lords decided that the text was ambiguous and obscure and accordingly
permitted reference to legislative history.
A leading American textualist has suggested that courts have much latitude in
deciding whether language is ambiguoua." This same point was made by Lord
Justice Oliver, who recognized in his opinion in Pepper v Hart that "[iJngenuity can
sometimes suggest ambiguity or obscruity where none exists in fact.,,3 Indeed, the
series of decisions in Pepper v Hart shows that judges had found that the relevant
statutory text had a determinate meaning prior to the proffer of legislative history to
the House of Lords showing that Parliament had not intended what judges had
previously understood as the plain meaning of the text.
That textualist interpretation had been presented in the Court of Appeal's decision,
which included lengthy opinions by two judges. Lord Justice Nicholls concluded that
the statutory text required that the tax benefit be valued based on "the amount of the
expense incurred by the employer in providing the benefit," rather than on the
marginal cost to the employer of filling seats that would otherwise have been vacant. 37
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Lord Justice Slade agreed that the Nicholls "interpretation of [the text's] effect is
inescapable.t'" Both of these opinions present the text as having a clear, determinate,
indeed an "inescapable" meaning.
When the House of Lords itself initially considered Pepper v Hart, it too viewed the
text as unambiguous. A majority of the panel of five members of the House of Lords
concurred with the view of the Court of Appeal that the text dictated an average-cost
approach to determining the value of an in-house fringe benefit. This conclusion had
41
been reached by Lords Bridge." Oliver,4o and Browne- Wilkinson.
These three
Lords must have viewed the text as unambiguous, because, in the case of ambiguity,
they would presumably have taken the same approach as Lord Mackay in the
rehearing and have ap¥lied the substantive canon favoring taxpayers when a revenue
statute is ambiguous."
Pepper itself thus illustrates how the garbled text requirement may be manipulated by
judges wishing to follow what they infer to be the intent of Parliament. Although the
House of Lords asserts that it insists upon a foundationalist approach - that is, only the
text may be considered when deciding whether the statute is garbled - the court
rejected its own reading of the text only after it was informed about the contradictory
legislative history. This is not the approach of a foundationalist, who would condemn
an interpretive approach that rejected the determinate meaning of text in favor of
another meaning discernible in the legislative history.
Nevertheless, the House of Lords indicated that it would not abandon wholly the
foundationalist primacy of text, when two Lords indicated that they would decline to
hold that a statute had a meaning that conflicted with its text, regardless of the
Parliamentary materials supporting such an interpretation.Y Lord Bridge, while
acknowledging that the text required the tax benefit to be determined based on
average cost if "construed by conventional criteria.?" rejected that "technical rule of
construction requiring me to ignore the very material which in this case indicates
unequivocally which of two possjble interpretatjons was intended by Parliament.',45
Meanwhile, Lord Griffiths set down his basic interpretive rule as follows: "The object
of the court in interpreting legislation is to give effect so far as the lani:uai:e peonits to
the intention of the legislature.?" For both these Lords, therefore, the intentionalist
approach is permitted only when the resulting interpretation conforms to some
possible reading of the text. This fail-safe rule closely resembles the Hart and Sacks
rules of purposivist interpretation, which barred any interpretation that the words of
47
the statute could not bear.
The second critical threshold requirement prescribed in Pepper is that the legislative
history must demonstrate the clearly signified intent of Parliament. That is, the
language must be unambiguous and be presented by a source with a reliable pedigree.
The House of Lords decided that these requirements had been met in Pepper because,
in presenting the legislation, a Ministry official had informed Parliament that the bill
had been amended to ensure that in-house fringe benefits would be taxed based on
48
their marginal costs to the employer, rather than on the basis of the average COSt.
The legislative history relied upon in Pepper thus plainly met these requirements and
the case therefore does not yield much insight into the problems that may arise in
ensuring that the legislative history is reliable. That the underlying concern about
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reliability is a real one can be recognized when the American experience with
intentionalist interpretation is considered. American courts will consider all varieties
of legislative history, with courts indicating that there is a sliding scale of the
reliability of such materials.49 Advocates in American courts will often include all
sorts of supportive legislative history in trying to advocate their preferred
interpretation of a statute. The effect of this approach is, in the view of one
distinguished American judge, largely equivalent to picking out friends in a crowd
(i.e., the favorable legislative history) and then inferring that the crowd is therefore
friendly (i.e., construing the statute in accordance with that select history).5o
Having defined the new rules that Pepper prescribed for the use of legislative history
in interpreting statutory provisions, we now consider several later cases applying these
new rules to evaluate the impact that Pepper has had on statutory interpretation in
England.
III.

The Effect of Pepper v Hart: Has the 1)se of Lel;isJatjye History Been Limited
or Has Enl;lish Interpretation Been Americanized

A.

The Threshold Requirement ora Garbled Text

Lord Browne-Wilkinson's opinion stated that reference may be made to parliamentary
materials only when the statutory text is garbled due to ambiguity, obscurity or
absurdity. We have already discussed the fundamental problem with Pepper's
threhold requirement of a garbled text - there is no generaUy accepted standard for
5
clarity so that whether a text is ambiguous or obscure is often controversial. I This
problem may be illustrated by the House of Lords decision in Melluish (Inspector of
Taxes) v EMI (No 3) Ltd. 52 There, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, through a process of
close reading and reasoning, concluded that the statutory text had a determinate
meaning. That meaning, he stated, was "force] d]" by "the clear words" of the text and
"an anomalous result" that would foUow from a contrary interpretation. 53
Nevertheless, in the very next paragraph of his opinion, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
stated that he "accept]s] that the language of[the statute] is ambiguous and obscure"
and that the court may therefore refer to legislative history to discern its true intent. 54
If that history had demonstrated that the legislature had intended something other than
the meaning of the "clear words" of the text, Lord Browne-Wilkinson would
presumably have foUowed that nontextuaI intent. This is hardly the interpretive
method of a foundationalist court.
The foundationalism of English statutory interpretation has been undercut also by
decisions in several other cases. In these cases, the courts have considered the
legislative history proffered to them, even though these courts have found that the
statutory text is clear on its face and unambiguous. To be sure, however, the
significance of these cases should not be overstated because the courts decided that
the legislative history was either inconclusive or confirmed the plain meaning of the
text.
Several cases wiU illustrate this approach. 55 In Regina v Warwickshire County
Council." the House of Lords considered the meaning of section 20(1) of the
Consumer Protection Act 1987. The issue was whether that provision, which made it
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unlawful to provide consumers with misleading information aboutJ'rices "in the
course of [a] business of his," applied to an employee ofa retailer.
Lord Roskill
gave the decision and he first focused on the statutory text and concluded "that the
words 'in the course of any business of his' must mean any business of which the
defendant is either the owner or in which he has a controlling interest. ,,58
Notwithstanding this determinate meaning, Lord Roskill proceeded to discuss the
legislative history of this provision, which included a statement by the minister that
the statute was drafted to ensure that only the employer would be subject to liability.59
This use oflegislative history to confirm that the text means what it says closely
resembles the nonfoundationalist, American approach to interpretation. Indeed, the
court's willingness to consider the legislative history in this case is notable because
the rule of lenity to criminal defendants should have given the defendent the benefit of
any statutory doubt in any event.
Other courts have taken this approach as well. In British and Commonwealth
Holdings pic v Barclays Bank plc,60 the Court of Appeal decided that the relevant text
of the Companies Act 1985 was unambiguous," and still discussed the legislative
62
history, which was viewed as "coincid[ing] with" the meanin~ of the text.
Finally,
in Building Societies Commission v Halifax Building Society, 3 Chadwick J in the
Chancery Division had to interpret the meaning of Section 100(8) of the Building
Societies Act 1986. Chadwick J was "satisfied that the words 'in priority to other
subscribers' can be given an intelligible meaning.T" Nevertheless, the judge
included a lengthy discussion of the parliamentary debate that yielded the statutory
text65 and opined that "there is nothing in the parliamentary material or in the
consultative paper which points to any other meaning for those words.,,66 The
interpretive approach taken in each of these cases indicates that the first requirement
of Pepper has been weakened and that, in the event reliable parliamentary materials
were to demonstrate an intent that conflicted with the "intelligible meaning" of the
statutory text, English courts would interpret the statute to conform to the true intent
of Parliament.
If, indeed, the legislative history were to contradict the text's meaning, disagreement
about whether the statutory text was actually garbled would more likely arise. Thus,
in Associated Newspapers Ltd v Wilson'" a majority of the House of Lords concluded
that the statutory text was ambiguous and then relied on parliamentary materials to
infer the statute's meaning.i" Lord Lloyd, in a dissent, contended that the meaning of
the text was clear and that the reference to legislative history was accordingly
improper. 69 Interestingly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not specifically address the
garbled text re~uirement in his opinion and he may instead have applied the fail safe
rule of Pepper. 0 Because he believed that the legislative history defined the
legislature's intent so clearly, he seemed concerned only that the statutory text was
capable of bearing that meaning." He was not content to give the text its determinate
meaning as long as that meaning was not absurd.
In sum, the failure offoundationalism, which could be glimpsed in the application of
the garbled-text requirement in Pepper, is apparent in cases that have followed
Pepper. English courts have became more intentionalist in their interpretive approach
and appear willing to rely on legislative history to support interpretations that may
conflict with the determinate meaning of the text.
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B.

The Requirement that the Lei:islative History Be Sufficiently Reliable to
Demonstrate Intention

Before considering how the reliability requirement has fared since Pepper was
decided, it should be noted that this requirement is unlikely to limit significantly the
costs of litigation that result from permitting intentionalist arguments to and decisions
by courts. The reason for this is straightforward: If litigants gain confidence that
courts will consider their arguments based on legislative history - confidence that
must in fact be growing based on the decisions sampled in the previous section litigators will find that they will have to research the legislative history of statutes to
determine whether reliable legislative history exists that conflicts with the statute's
apparent meaning. The reliability requirement relates to the court's confidence in
reaching conclusions about the legislature's true intent, but does not have much
bearing on the need to consider the legislative history in the first instance. That need
has become apparent based on the English courts' new nonfoundationalist approach.
Given that Pepper's threshold requirement of a garbled text appears to be ineffective
in limiting judicial consideration of legislative history, Pepper's requirements about
the reliability oflegislative history may, however, become more important in defining
the situations in which courts may employ nontextual indicia of intent to justify an
intentionalist interpretation. As defined in Pepper, the reliability of legislative history
depended both on clearly signified intent and on sufficient pedigree. The latter
requirement has not yet been the subject of significant analysis and courts appear to be
willing to consider only the statements of ministers or the proponents of the enacted
bill. The clearly signified intent requirement has, however, been the subject of new
decisions by the House of Lords and other courts. In Melluish (Inspector a/Taxes) v
EMI (No 3) Ltd,72 the House of Lords sought to tighten the clarity requirement by
stating that "the only materials which can properly be introduced [as legislative
history] are clear statements made by a minister or other promoter of the Bill directed
to the very point in question in the litigation,,73 The only acceptable legislative
materials were those "directed to the specific statutory provision under consideration
[and] to the problem raised by the litigation." 74 The House of Lords accordingly
declined to consider the statements that ministers had made about other portions of the
statute at issue, stating that a court should not be involved in "the interpretation of the
ministerial statement and the question whether anything said in relation to the other
provision can have any bearing on the provision before the court", 75 Although the
House of Lords opined that by foreclosing consideration of such statements it was
preventing "much expense and delay.?" the loosening of the garbled text requirement
has resulted in those expenses and a stricter reliability requirement will not relieve
litigants of the need to research adequately the legislative history.
In addition to strengthening the clarity requirement in Melluish, the House of Lords
also included words of stern warning to litigants who presented courts with legislative
history that failed to meet the sufficient clarity requirement. The House of Lords
stated that "Judges should be astute to check such misuse of the new rule [in Pepper]
by making appropriate orders as to costs wasted.,,77 This admonition puts litigants in
the position of having to decide whether legislative history is sufficiently clear to
present to a court in support of an intentionalist construction. Given how English
courts have been willing to view clear statutory texts as ambiguous so that they may
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consider the legislative histories, litigants may have to risk censure and costs by
providing courts with legislative materials that the courts mayor may not find to be
sufficiently clear. This burden rests unfairly on litigants: English courts appear
willing to abandon the foundationalism of textualism, and yet nevertheless desire to
have litigants decide at their peril whether the legislative history is sufficiently clear to
support a particular intentionalist interpretation. This is very unlike the situation in
the United States where lawyers typically present the best possible textualist,
intentionalist, and purposivist case in favor of their preferred interpretation ofthe
statute and then leave the court with the responsibility to determine what the statute
really means.
Other post-Pepper cases also have relied on the sufficient clarity requirement to
decline intentionalist interpretations.l" In Hillsdown Holdings pic v Pensions
Ombudsman and others,79 for example, the Queen's Bench Division held that the
sufficient clarity requirement barred the court from considering post-enactment
legislative history. The court declined to consider a minister's statements, which were
made after a bill's enactment, because the statement could not be seen as showing the
intent behind legislation being considered by Parliament. 80 In other cases courts have
rejected reliance on legislative history when the minister's statements were viewed as
no clearer than the statutory text itself.8l
IV.

Conclusion

When Lord Browne-Wilkinson announced that the House of Lords was changing the
rule excluding the use of legislative history to discern what Parliament meant by the
words of the statute, he sought to prescribe new rules of interpretation that would
avoid the significant problems he perceived in the American law of statutory
interpretation.f
Cases that have applied Pepper's exclusionary rule suggest that
English law has been Americanized, notwithstanding the desires and concerns of Lord
Browne-Wilkinson. The prevention of further Americanization is far more likely to
follow from a stricter judicial application of the garbled-text requirement, than from
forcing litigants to bear extra costs when they have sought judicial consideration of
legislative history that is found to be insufficiently clear by the judiciary.

Michael P. Healy
Visiting Lecturer, Coventry University
Associate Professor, University of Kentucky
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FOOTNOTES
1

See William N Eskridge, Jr & Philip P Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321, 324 (1990) (categorizing the three
principal modern theories of statutory interpretation as intentional ism,
purposivism or modified intentionalism, and textualism).

2

See William N Eskridge, Jr, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621
(1991); Richard J Pierce, Jr, The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95
Colum L Rev 749 (1995).

3

See Thomas W Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 Wash ULQ 351, 351, 363 (1994). Justice Scalia has been characterized as
"the most prominent textualist on the contemporary Supreme Court." William
D Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political Language and the Political
Process 337 (1993).

4

See Frank H Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983).

5

See Merrill, supra note 3, at 352 ("The critical assumption [oftextualism] is
that interpretation should be objective rather than subjective; that is, the judge
should ask what the ordinary reader of a statute would have understood the
words to mean at the time of enactment, not what the intentions of the enacting
legislature were." (footnote omitted)).

6

See Frank H Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 59, 62 (1988) ("The use of original
~
rather than an objective inquiry into the reasonable import of the
language permits a series of moves. Each move greatly increases the
discretion, and therefore the power, of the court."); see also Pierce, supra note
2, at 777.

7

The use of legislative history to construe legislative intent first occurred in the
United States Supreme Court more than one hundred years ago. See Baade,
"Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 Tex L
Rev 1001, 1079 (1991) (describing Dubuque & Pac R R v Litchfield, 64 US
(23 How) 66 (1860), as the case in which "the Supreme Court first resorted to
legislative history in aid of statutory construction." (footnote omitted)). See
also Carro & Brarm, The US Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 Jurimetrics J 294 (1982) (documenting the
fact that the Court has increasingly cited legislative history since the late
1930's).

10

8

Supra note 6. See also Felix Frankfurter, Foreword - A Symposium on
Statutory Construction, 3 Vand L Rev 365, 366-67 (1950) ("In one of those
felicitous sentences which Mr. Justice Holmes tossed off in a letter, he
characterized intention as 'a residuary clause intended to gather up whatever
aids there may be to interpretation beside the particular words and the
dictionary." (citation omitted».

9

For an example of this approach in the United States Supreme Court, see
Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470, 490 (1917), where the Court stated
that:
"when words [of the text] are free from doubt they must be taken as the
final expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or
subtracted from by considerations drawn from titles or designating
names or reports, accompanying their introduction or from any
extraneous source ... The language being plain, and not leading to
absurd or wholly impractical consequences, it is the sole evidence of
the ultimate legislative intent."

10

For an example of this approach in the United States Supreme Court, see
United States v American Trucking Ass 'n, 310 US 534, 543-44 (1940)
(footnotes omitted), where the Court stated that, "[w]hen aid to construction of
the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be
no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
'superficial examination'."

II

Followers of each of these three approaches to interpretation defend their
preferred approach as consistent with the principle oflegislative supremacy.
This claim can be made because each approach purports to follow the
directives of the legislature in assigning meaning to the statute enacted by it.
The differences among the approaches are in where and how the courts will
discern the legislative directives.

12

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note I, at 332-33.

13

3 Co Rep 7a (1584).

14

Criticisms of purposivism include the concerns that it is based on
unrealistically optimistic assumptions about the legislative process, see
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 334-35, and that it provides courts with
too much discretionary power. See Cass Sunstein, After the Rights
Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 137-38 (1990). For a
particularly strong critique of purposivism, see the dissenting opinion of thenJustice Rehnquist in United Steelworkers of Am v Weber, 443 US 193 (1979).

15

Another approach, for example, has been labelled dynamic interpretation.
This approach is controversial because in certain circumstances it would
abandon the principle oflegislative supremacy and permit judicial updating of
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statutes. See William N Eskridge, Jr, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78
Geo LJ 319, 322 (1989), where Professor Eskridge states that:
"Dynamic interpretation is most often appropriate in three situations:
when there has been a material change in circumstances between the
date of enactment and the date of application, when the legislature has
compromised its original policy in subsequent statutes, or when new
meta-policies have overtaken original legislative expectations."
16

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at 353.

17

For example, the United States Supreme Court cases cited supra at notes 9 and
10 support contrary approaches to statutory interpretation. See also Micheal P
Healy, The Attraction and Limits of Textualism: The Supreme Court Decision
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